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ABSTRACT
A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure Allocation: An Empirical Assessment
by Olivier Cadot, Lars-Hendrik Röller, and Andreas Stephan*
This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribu-
tion of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the
political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate
a potential source of bias in production-function estimates and generate testable
hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy. Our empirical findings on a
panel of France's regions over 1985-91 suggest that influence activities were, indeed,
significant determinants of the cross-regional allocation of transportation infrastructure
investments. Moreover, we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of
economic returns to infrastructure spending, even after controlling for pork-barrel and
when imposing an exogenous preference for convergence in regional productivity levels.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Ein polit-ökonomisches Modell von Infrastrukturallokation: Eine empirische
Einschätzung
In dieser Untersuchung wird ein simultanes Gleichungssystem zur Schätzung des
Beitrags von Verkehrsinfrastrukturinvestitionen zu regionalem Wachstum verwendet.
Es wird explizit der politische Prozeß modelliert, der Infrastrukturinvestitionen
determiniert; dadurch wird eine mögliche Ursache einer verzerrten Parameterschätzung
vermieden, die eintreten kann, wenn Produktionsfunktionen einzeln geschätzt werden.
Gleichzeitig fließen in das Modell weitere empirisch überprüfbare Hypothesen über die
Determinanten von Infrastrukturpolitik ein. Die empirischen Ergebnisse für einen
Paneldatensatz mit 21 französischen Regionen im Zeitraum 1985-1991 zeigen, daß
unterstützende Aktivitäten in der Tat einen signifikanten Einfluß auf die regionale
Allokation von Verkehrsinfrastrukturinvestitionen haben. Darüber hinaus werden nur
wenig empirische Hinweise dafür gefunden, daß auch erwartete Produktivitätseffekte
von Infrastruktur bei der regionalen Allokation in Frankreich von Bedeutung sind.
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1 Introduction
If there is little doubt that investment in public infrastructure capital is a necessary con-
dition for long-run growth in industrial countries and, a fortiori, in developing ones,
how much infrastructure investment actually contributes to growth is still, in spite of a
long-standing debate, a largely unsettled question. Disagreement over the magnitudes
involved has persisted in spite of a massive amount of research sparked by the influen-
tial work of Aschauer (1989). Using aggregate data for the US between 1949 and 1985,
Aschauer found that the elasticity of output to a broad measure of public infrastruc-
ture capital was significant and quantitatively very large; other studies using aggregate
data (Holtz-Eakin, 1988, and Munnell, 1990a) also found public capital to influence pro-
ductivity significantly. At a time of widespread concern about the slowdown in US
productivity growth, these findings suggested that a decline in the rate of public-capital
accumulation was “a potential new culprit” (Munnell, 1990a, p. 3).
However, the early studies were fraught with logical and econometric difficulties,
the most important of which are discussed in Gramlich’s 1994 review essay. Among the
econometric problems, it was pointed out that the direction of causation was unclear (see
Eisner, 1991; Tatom, 1993; or Holtz-Eakin, 1994). For instance, Holtz-Eakin remarked
that “it is tempting to infer a causal relationship from public-sector capital to produc-
tivity, but the evidence does not justify this step. It is just as easy to imagine the reverse
scenario in which deteriorating economic conditions reduce capital-stock growth” (1994,
p. 12). Disagreement over the meaning of elasticity estimates was not limited to time-
series studies. Munnell (1990b) and Garcia-Mila` (1992) also found positive elasticities
of output to public capital using panel data at the state level, but state-level evidence
was vulnerable to similar criticism: quoting again Holtz-Eakin (1994, p. 13), “[b]ecause
more prosperous states are likely to spend more on public capital, there will be a posi-
tive correlation between the state-specific effects and public sector capital. This should
not be confused, however, with the notion that greater public capital leads a state to be
more productive”. Holtz-Eakin’s own approach consisted of introducing fixed effects in
the specification of the error structure in order to control for unobserved state charac-
teristics. But, as he himself remarked (p. 13), “in doing so the investigator ignores the
information from cross-state variation in the variables”, which is of course unfortunate
given that in a panel of short duration a substantial part of the information comes, pre-
cisely, from the data’s cross-sectional variation. Moreover, if the endogeneity of public
infrastructure investments is a serious problem, the best way to address it is probably
the most direct one, that is, to use simultaneous-equation methods (see Hulten, 1995 for
a discussion; see also Tatom, 1993). A few authors followed this approach, e.g. Duffy-
Deno and Eberts (1991) or Flores de Frutos and Pereira (1993), and nevertheless found
significant elasticities of output to infrastructure capital. But the key question, if one
believes that the endogeneity issue matters, is how infrastructure investment decisions
should be modelled.
Clearly, the “second equation” should be grounded in a theory of how public infras-
tructure investment decisions are made, i.e. on some explicit view about what drives
policy-making. Indeed, Gramlich (1994) rightly points out that the primary interest of
the infrastructure debate is not so much in the battle over elasticity estimates as in the
implied policy debate. In his words, “rather than asking whether there is a shortage,
it seems more helpful to ask what, if any, policies should be changed” (p. 1190). What
Gramlich suggests is to focus explicitly on policy choices and the institutional context
in which they are made in order to assess, from a normative perspective, whether they
are socially optimal or not. This presupposes that institutions and policy choices are
designed to maximize social welfare. But are they? A growing literature, at the frontier
of economics and political science, views economic-policy decisions as resulting from
the maximization by incumbent politicians of objective functions that may depart con-
siderably from social welfare, under constraints that are primarily political (see Dixit,
1996, for a survey). This literature approaches from a positive angle questions that used
to be the realm of the normative, taking policy variables to be endogenous rather than
control variables. Ultimately, normative considerations are likely to reappear, e.g. in the
form of prescriptions in favor of rules or institutions mitigating policy capture by special
interests; but the literature’s key message is that irrespective of what politicians ought
to do, economists need to understand what they actually do and why. For instance, if
public infrastructure investment decisions are influenced by pork-barrel politics, pork-
barrel politics should be part of the model. We believe that this provides a useful starting
point for a discussion of what the “second equation” should be.
In this perspective, the present paper is a first attempt to formally bridge the gap be-
tween the infrastructure and political-economy literature. More specifically, we apply a
common-agency model to the allocation of infrastructure investment in France. In prin-
ciple, there exist other political economy mechanisms that may be able to explain how
infrastructure investment is allocated in a particular country. However, the centralist in-
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stitutional context in France lends itself towards an analysis under the common-agency
setup. To put it differently, an empirical test of the common-agency model in political
economy is ideally suited for the French environment.
The initial assumption is that firms have sunk investments giving them vested in-
terests in the quality of the infrastructure in regions where they have production units
(henceforth called “establishments”). We also posit that a firm with a large establish-
ment in a given region should be expected to lobby harder than other firms for the
maintenance and upgrading of that region’s infrastructure, for three reasons. First, large
establishments produce, on average, for more distant markets (as higher volumes must
be absorbed by wider geographical areas); as a result, they use highways and railways
more intensively than others and are consequently more concerned about their mainte-
nance and upgrading. Second, large establishments are typically owned by firms with
headquarters in Paris; those firms are likely to be in a better position to effectively rein-
force local lobbying by direct access to national policy-makers. Third, although we do
not deal explicitly with collective-action problems in mobilizing local political resources,
such problems are likely to be easier overcome by a few firms with large stakes, such as
Michelin in Auvergne or Citroe¨n in Bretagne, than for a host of small or medium-sized
local firms. For all these reasons, we assume that the number of large establishments
in a region has a positive influence on the intensity of that region’s lobbying for trans-
portation infrastructure investment.
The form of the lobbying is very simple: we suppose that firms offer campaign con-
tributions to incumbent politicians in return for additional spending. At the margin,
these contributions reflect the firms’ willingness to pay for additional infrastructure—
that is, they reflect the infrastructure’s marginal contribution to firm value, both on the
supply side, through the infrastructure’s contribution to productivity in all sectors, and
on the demand side for the construction industry itself.1 The political process is as fol-
lows. Local politicians (we focus on regional presidents, whose power of influence has
increased after administrative reforms enacted in 1982) act as contribution-collectors,
providing their affiliated parties’ headquarters with promises of locally-generated cam-
paign contributions. Their own role is to assemble credible public-works projects for
their region (as per their constituents’ demands) and submit them to Paris for approval.
1Our panel covers a period (1985-91) immediately preceding a new law on political party financing.
Ample anecdotal evidence suggests that, prior to that reform, a substantial part of the financing of main-
stream parties came from contributions linked to public-works contracts.
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Final decisions are made at the national level, either in the Ministry of Transport for
relatively minor projects, or at Cabinet meetings for larger ones; ceteris paribus, local
politicians who (i) share the national executive’s political obedience and (ii) generate
substantial campaign financing, are rewarded with a larger slice of the cake; this is what
we call “pork-barrel politics”. Thus, the process can be viewed as an auction whereby
incumbent politicians sell infrastructure investments to local lobbies who bid for them
through campaign contributions. Of course, in reality the mechanism through which
lobbying pressures are transmitted from the local to the national level is neither as fric-
tionless nor as transparent as it is portrayed here. But the central idea that local politi-
cians are more effective voices for their constituents’ demands if they happen to share
the national executive’s current political obedience is a plausible one and is supported
by the data.
In order to capture this idea, we approximate lobbying by two variables: the number
of large firms in each region and—perhaps more importantly—a dummy variable equal
to one when a regional council’s majority and the national government are of the same
obedience (left wing or right wing) and zero otherwise. We find both measures of lobby-
ing influence to be significant, statistically and in magnitude. Since lobbying takes place
over investment levels (i.e. flows) and output is determined by stocks, one may suspect
that the simultaneity bias in the output equation, may not be very large. As it turns out,
the simultaneity bias from estimating a production function alone is negligible, as sin-
gle equation elasticity estimates are almost identical to those obtained by simultaneous
estimation of both equations. It appears that stocks are too large relative to investments
for feedback influences to be a real source of concern over a sample period of less than a
decade. We also find that over our sample period (during which left-wing parties were
in power for five years and right-wing ones for two), the French government did not
seem to be significantly concerned by the maximization of the economic returns to in-
frastructure spending. This result, which is robust to changes in the functional form of
the government’s objective function, reinforces our conclusion that pork-barrel consid-
erations were important—if not primary—policy drivers in the sample period. Finally,
we carry out an exercise in which we compare the actual allocation of infrastructure in-
vestments across regions with a simulated socially optimal value. Interestingly, we find
that most of the cross-regional variation in investment levels is attributable to pork bar-
rel, suggesting that uniform allocation would be a good rule of thumb to reduce policy
capture by lobbies.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we state gen-
eral conditions for the efficient provision of a public input and derive conditions under
which influence activities lead to inefficient provision in a political-economy model. In
section 3, we report the results of empirical testing of the model’s structural equations
on a French data set. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
Basic results on the optimal provision of public inputs were derived by Kaizuka (1965),
Sandmo (1972), and Negishi (1973). We briefly review these results in the following sec-
tion in order to provide a benchmark against which inefficiencies arising from influence
activities can be assessed.
2.1 Efficient provision of a public input
Consider an economy producing m final goods for consumption, with technologies Qi =
Fi(Ki , Li, X), for i = 1, ..., m, where Ki and Li are respectively the amounts of capital and
labor used up in the production of good i and X is a pure public input. Following
Negishi (1973), we take the latter to be of the “unpaid input” type, meaning that the
function Fi is linearly homogenous in Ki, Li and X.2 When such is the case, owners
of capital, which are residual claimants, appropriate the rents generated by the public
input if the latter is not priced at the value of its marginal product. This is a source of
potential inefficiency in capital-allocation decisions; but for simplicity (and for reasons
that will become clear in the empirical part of the paper) we will limit the analysis to
a short-run case where capital is fixed; the theory can be easily extended to a long-run
case.
Let the public input be produced with labor only according to a technology G(LX),
and let L =
å
m
i=1 Li + LX be the economy’s total endowment of labor. For reasons that
will become clear later on, we will assume that the social utility function is quasilinear
(necessary conditions for the aggregation of individual preferences into a social utility
2The alternative formulation is to assume that the production function is linearly homogenous in Ki
and Li alone and has increasing returns in all factors including X. This alternative formulation is generally
seen as appropriate for publicly-provided R&D, whereas the classical example of the former formulation
is, according to Sandmo (1972) and Negishi (1973), transportation infrastructure.
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function are assumed to hold); thus, U(Q1, ..., Qm) = Q1 + å mi=2 u(Qi) where the func-
tion u is increasing and concave.
Given this, the problem of a social planner is:3
max
L1,...,Lm,LX
Q1 +
m
å
i=2
u(Qi)
s.t.
Qi = Fi(Ki , Li, X), i = 1, ..., m, (1)
X = G(LX),
L =
m
å
i=1
Li + LX .
Letting subscripts denote partial derivatives (so FiL = ¶ Fi= ¶ Li and FiX = ¶ Fi= ¶ X), solving
(1) and rearranging the resulting first-order conditions gives the basic condition for the
efficient provision of X; namely,
m
å
i=1
FiX
FiL
=
1
G0
. (2)
Condition (2), which closely parallels Samuelson’s condition for the optimal provi-
sion of public goods, was initially derived by Kaizuka (1965). It states that the sum
over industries (firm-level production functions can be aggregated within each industry
because the production function is homogenous) of the rates of technical substitution
between labor and the public input must be equated to the marginal cost of the public
input’s provision.
Whereas the maximization of social utility under technology and factor-endowment
constraints is the most natural way of deriving (2), this efficiency condition can also
be derived from the maximization of firm profits. Let good 1 be the numeraire, pi the
price of good i in terms of good 1, and w the wage rate, and fix all prices and the wage
rate at the levels obtained implicitly from the solution of problem (1). Suppose that, at
these exogenously given prices and wage, firms make profit-maximizing decisions con-
tingent on X; let also H be the inverse function of G so that LX = H(X). A government
3Transportation infrastructure is used as an input not only by firms, but also by households; so a
complete statement of the problem should include a household production function. We will abstract
from such considerations and treat transportation infrastructure as a “pure input”.
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maximizing firm profits by choice of X will solve:
maxX F1(K1, L1, X) + å mi=2 piFi(Ki, Li, X)−w å mi=1 Li −wH(X)
s.t
F1L = p2F2L = ... = piFiL = w.
(3)
It is easily checked that the solution of (3) satisfies first-order condition (2) and conse-
quently yields the same level of provision of X. Although straightforward, this result is
very important for our purposes. To see why, consider a simple influence-activity game
in which firms offer monetary contributions to an incumbent politician in exchange for
the public input’s provision, and suppose that the incumbent maximizes the sum of
those contributions net of the input’s cost. If, at the margin, contributions reflect the
willingness of firms to pay for the input, the influence-activity game’s unique equilib-
rium is the solution to (3). In other words, if Ci(X) is industry i’s offer of a monetary
contribution to the government and  i = piFi(Ki , Li, X)−wLi (with pi = 1 when i = 1)
is its profits, whenever ¶ Ci= ¶ X = ¶  i= ¶ X, a government maximizing
å i Ci(X)−wH(X)
will maximize (3) and consequently provide X according to (2). Thus, influence activi-
ties by themselves do not imply inefficient provision of the public input.
This result—namely, that the existence of influence activities is not a sufficient condi-
tion for an inefficient policy outcome—is simply a restatement of Bernheim and Whin-
ston’s (1986a) result according to which, if influence activities can be represented as a
“menu auction” and if special-interest groups bid for policy according to their marginal
valuation, the resulting “truthful” equilibrium is Pareto-efficient (see also Bernheim and
Whinston, 1986b, for parallel efficiency results in a common-agency context). This re-
sult also appears in a trade-policy context in Grossman and Helpman (1994) who show
that in a small open economy, if all agents are represented in one lobby or another, the
resulting equilibrium is free trade. We now turn to conditions under which influence
activities do lead to inefficient policy choices.
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2.2 Influence activities and inefficient policies
We have established that, in the case of a pure public input, a “policy auctioneer” imple-
ments the same policies that a social planner would, provided that all firms have access
to the bidding process and bid according to their marginal willingness to pay. It follows
that inefficiencies can come from only two sources. First, some firms may not have ac-
cess to the bidding process, or may choose to free-ride. For instance, small firms may
keep out of lobbying because it entails an entry fee that is prohibitive for them. This kind
of incomplete coverage of the bidding process may lead to under-provision of the public
input, quite like a standard collective-action problem. If infrastructures are specific to
geographical entities, like regions or states, and the number of large firms varies across
these entities, distortions will also appear in the spatial allocation of the public input.4
Second, incumbent politicians may pursue an agenda of their own; that is, instead of
simply maximizing the sum of the lobbies’ transfers as a pure auctioneer would, they
may maximize a composite function in which lobbying and non-lobbying arguments
enter as substitutes. Non-lobbying arguments—such as priority development of some
types of regional infrastructures—may entail choices which, although desirable from
the incumbent’s perspective, deviate from the first-best allocation of the public input.
But they may also reflect economic-efficiency considerations, as opposed to pork barrel
(this is the case considered by Grossman and Helpman, 1994, in which the government
maximizes a linear combination of social welfare and contributions from lobbies).
For instance, suppose that the incumbent government maximizes a convex combina-
tion of social utility U(.) and a monetary contribution Ck(X) from some non-numeraire
industry k. Again, the economy is in a competitive equilibrium as far as consumption
and the allocation of labor across industries are concerned, the government’s only prob-
lem being the provision of public input X.
Suppose that the government now maximizes a linear combination of industry k’s
contribution and social utility, the resource constraint being represented as in problem
(3) by the term wH(X). Although we are aggregating money and “utils”, this poses no
particular problem as long as preferences are quasilinear. Letting a be the weight on
4Note that the existence of lobbying implies that collective-action problems are at least partially over-
come. If collective-action problems were so severe as to hamper any lobbying, there would be no distortion
in the state’s provision of the public input.
8
social utility the government now solves
maxX (1 − a)Ck(X) + a [Q1 + å mi=2 u(Qi)]−wH(X)
s.t.
Qi = Fi(Ki , Li, X), i = 1, ..., m,
F1L = p2F2L = ... = pmFmL = w,
u0 = pi 8 i = 2, ..., m,
Ck0(X) = ¶  k= ¶ X = pkFkX ,
(4)
with first-order condition
(1 − a)pk FkX + a
 
F1X + u
0
m
å
i=2
FiX
!
−wH 0 = 0,
after substitution of the relevant constraints, this becomes
FkX
FkL
+ a
å
i 6=k
FiX
FiL
= H 0. (5)
Thus, efficiency condition (2) is now violated; as the left-hand side of (5) is a decreasing
function of X whereas its right-hand side is an increasing one, the public input is un-
derprovided in (5) compared to (2). However, underprovision follows from the choice
of a convex combination of social utility and industry k’s contribution in the objective
function; non-convex linear combinations could yield overprovision. In the empirical
part of this paper, we will not impose convexity.
Given that (5)’s departure from optimality comes from the fact that sector k and only
sector k lobbies, it can be eliminated in two ways. First, the distortion shrinks as a in-
creases; in the limit, when a = 1, (5) reduces to (2). That is, the departure from optimality
disappears if the government’s valuation of sector k’s contribution goes to zero. Second,
if all industries lobby, (5) reduces to (2) irrespective of the value of a in [0, 1], because by
maximizing a convex combination of social utility and the profits of competitive firms,
the government in effect maximizes twice the same thing.
Although simple, this theoretical framework provides a useful starting point for our
empirical exploration of the effect of lobbying on the allocation of transportation infras-
tructure investments. Whether or not there is underprovision of the public input as im-
plied by (5) is a very important question because under-investment in infrastructure is a
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subject of recurrent concern, in particular in the US.5 A second important implication of
(5) is that if the intensity or effectiveness of influence activities varies across states or re-
gions, distortions in the overall level of infrastructure investments will be compounded
by distortions in their spatial allocation. We now turn to an estimable model of regional
infrastructure allocation building on these foundations.
2.3 A model of regional infrastructure allocation
2.3.1 Production function
Let Qit be the aggregate output of region i at time t, Lit the level of regional employ-
ment, Kit the region’s aggregate (non-infrastructure) capital stock, and Xit its stock of
transportation infrastructure.6 All regions have identical aggregate Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions F:
Qit = F(Ait , Lit, Kit, Xit) = At LLit K
K
it X
X
it , (6)
where At is a technical-change parameter common to all regions. Note that this formu-
lation rules out cross-regional externalities in the productivity of transportation infras-
tructure; while this assumption is obviously an oversimplification, Gramlich (1990) and
Holtz-Eakin (1994) argued on the basis of US data that such externalities are unlikely
to be a major problem, as most traffic, even on interstate highways, is local. Moreover,
relaxing it would require the estimation of a large number of parameters relative to our
sample size. Dividing through by Lit, (6) becomes
qit = AtkKit x
X
it L
˜L
it , (7)
where qit is labor productivity, kit is the capital-labor ratio and xit is the stock of trans-
portation infrastructure per worker (we will henceforth use lower-case letters to desig-
5It should be noted, however, that the political model implicit in (4) is a representative-democracy one,
whereas in the US about 20% of new state and local construction must be approved by referendum (see
Gramlich, 1994). Peterson (1991) showed that under this partial direct-democracy mechanism the political
economy of infrastructure construction is also likely to lead to underprovision of the infrastructure, as
risk-averse politicians undertake projects only when assured of an overwhelming majority (the average
approval percentage in referenda was close to 70% over 1948-90).
6We abstract from non-transportation infrastructure like schools, hospitals, and so on.
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nate per-worker variables),7 and ˜L = L +K +X − 1. Note that ˜L = 0 if returns to
scale are constant.
As policy decisions are concerned with infrastructure investments rather than stocks,
for future purposes we need to establish the formal link between the two. The law of
motion of region i’s real transportation infrastructure stock Xit is given as
Xit = γXi,t−1 + Zit, (8)
where Zit denotes real gross investment in transportation infrastructure and 1 −γ is the
rate of depreciation of the infrastructure stock, so that
¶ Xit
¶ Zit
= 1. (9)
2.3.2 Policy function
We model lobbying as a common agency game. Although the problem should formally
be treated in an explicit intertemporal context (see Bergemann and Valimaki, 1998), for
the sake of simplicity we will reduce it to a succession of static games. In each period,
region-specific lobbies indexed by i = 1, ..., n (the principals) simultaneously face the
government with monetary transfer offers Cit(Zt) conditioned on the vector of trans-
portation infrastructure investments Zt = (Z1t , ..., Znt). These transfers can be inter-
preted, depending on the context, as political campaign contributions or outright bribes.
The government then chooses a value Zt of the policy vector Zt that maximizes a suit-
ably defined objective function V [Zt, å i Cit(Zt)]. Finally, lobbies make transfers Ci(Zt ) as
promised. In order to be consistent with the framework of the previous section, keeping
the same notation let V [Zt, å i Cit(Zt)] = au(Zt) + (1 − a) å i Cit(Zt)− H(Zt); the nature
of the functions u and H will be explained later on. Let also it(Zt) be the value of Zt
to lobby i. The game’s unique “truthful” equilibrium is characterized by the following
7Using per-worker variables reduces heteroscedasticity due to unequal region sizes.
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equations:
¶ Cjt(Zt)
¶ Zit

Zt
− ¶  jt(Zt)
¶ Zit

Zt
= 0, i, j = 1, ...n; (10)
a
¶ u
¶ Zit
+ (1 − a)
n
å
j=1
¶ Cjt
¶ Zit
− ¶ H
¶ Zit
= 0, i = 1, ...n. (11)
Equations (10) are “truthfulness” conditions whereas (11) is the government’s first-order
condition. Bernheim and Whinston (1986b, Theorem 2) state a number of sufficient
conditions under which the common-agency game’s unique equilibrium maximizes
the joint surplus of the agent and principals, i.e. under which it collapses to a single
principal-agent problem which, in the absence of hidden action, generates no ineffi-
ciency. These conditions do not apply here, because small firms do not lobby, whence
transfer functions are distorted. Thus, efficiency does not hold.
The first step in taking (10) and (11) to the data consists of parameterizing the u and
H functions. We define u as a nested function of Zt; i.e. u is a function of productivities
qit, themselves functions of Zt through (7). Specifically, let u(Zt) = 2 å i Litqit(Zt)1=2. This
formulation reflects the twin assumptions that the government values convergence in
per-capita incomes (hence the concave form),8 and that a given departure from optimal
productivity levels receives more weight, ceteris paribus, if it affects a more populous
region (hence the multiplicative term Lit).
The costs of these investments are captured by the function H. Some of the spending
is financed by corporate taxes whose impact is reflected in the firms’ willingness to lobby
(see details below). The rest is financed by other taxes which, although they do not di-
rectly affect the profits of local firms, affect local welfare and are therefore of concern to
the government. Accordingly, let H(Zt) = å i Litz2it=2. The quadratic form reflects a ris-
ing marginal distortion cost of individual tax burdens;9 in general, convexity (quadratic
or other) of infrastructure investments costs can reflect non-financial considerations as
well as financial ones. For instance, in a pork-barrel context, it may be politically impor-
tant for the incumbent government to appear even-handed in the distribution of favors.
Using these functional forms and differentiating the non-lobbying terms of (11) with
8Other functional forms, e.g. logarithmic, were tried in the estimation and found to yield similar
estimates.
9The tax burden can alternatively be expressed as a percentage of regional GDP; however, such a
formulation turns out to yield awkward functional forms with difficult-to-interpret parameters.
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respect to Zit gives
a
¶ u
¶ Zit
− ¶ H
¶ Zit
= aLitq
−1=2
it
1
Lit
¶ Qit
¶ Xit
¶ Xit
¶ Zit
− zit,
where zit = Zit=Lit. Using (6) and (9), this simplifies to
a
¶ u
¶ Zit
− ¶ H
¶ Zit
= aFX q
−1=2
it − zit, (12)
where FX = ¶ F= ¶ Xit .
We now turn to the lobbying term. In a transportation-infrastructure allocation prob-
lem, it is natural to suppose that lobbying is organized along regional lines, with indus-
trial firms playing an important role in the process. As already discussed, we will treat
transportation infrastructure as a pure input, so that only firms lobby for it, and we will
assume, in addition, that firms do not lobby in regions where they have only small pro-
duction units (this is the “small-firms-out” assumption). In the absence of cross-regional
externalities (discussed in section 2.3.1), firms having establishments in multiple regions
make separate lobbying decisions for each one of their establishments, so we can treat
the latter, without loss of generality, as separate firms. Accordingly, suppose that in any
region i, Nit identical, large “firms” are active in lobbying. Although large, these firms
are price-takers, and we will assume that they all produce a single manufactured good
priced at pit; as all variables are measured in constant 1992 francs in the empirical part,
we set pit = 1 for all i and t. As transportation infrastructure investments, in particu-
lar on highway maintenance and construction, are typically financed out of composite
packages combining local and national budgets, we model their impact on local taxes
through a tax function T ‘it (Zit). On the other hand, we assume that the use of transporta-
tion infrastructure is free. In order to include regional employment and private capital
stocks as right-hand side variables in the production function, we assume that they are
taken by the representative firm as fixed; finally, we denote by F‘ the production func-
tion of a representative large firm. The profit of a representative large firm in region i at
time t is then
 ‘it = pitF
‘(At, K‘it, L
‘
it, Xit)−witL‘it − ritK‘it − T ‘it (Zit), (13)
where wit and rit are the wage rate and the rental rate of capital in region i at time t.
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Suppose that firms pay local taxes in proportion to their employment in the region;10
then, letting L‘it be the total number of employees in large establishments in region i at
time t, the tax function facing a representative large firm in region i is
T ‘it (Zit) = 
Zit
Nit
L‘it
Lit
, (14)
for some (unknown) parameter . Substituting (14) into (13), aggregating over Nit iden-
tical large firms (i.e. multiplying by Nit) and differentiating with respect to Zit gives
¶ it
¶ Zit
= Nit
¶  ‘it
¶ Zit
= Nit

F‘X − T ‘0it (Zit)

= Nit

F‘X − 
l‘it
Nit

, (15)
where F‘X  ¶ F‘= ¶ Xit and l‘it = L‘it=Lit. We will henceforth assume that (15) is positive;
that is, that the marginal local-tax burden does not swamp the marginal benefit of in-
frastructure investments (since otherwise there would be no lobbying). Finally, using
(10) and making use of the no-externality assumption,
¶ Cjt
¶ Zit
=
¶  jt
¶ Zit
=
(
F‘X Nit − l‘it if j = i
0 otherwise.
(16)
The government’s first-order condition (11) is found by adding (16) to (12) and setting
their sum equal to zero. Finally, solving for zit yields
zit = aFX q
−1=2
it + (1 − a)(F‘X Nit − l‘it). (17)
Together, (7) and (17) form a system of two equations which we will estimate simultane-
ously, yielding consistent estimates of the contribution of transportation infrastructure
investments to GDP and of the extent of political interference with these investment
decisions.
10The largest local tax in France is the taxe professionnelle which is proportional to employment. As a
robustness check, we also tried empirically an alternative formulation whereby the tax burden on local
companies was proportional to their sales; it gave similar results.
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3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
We use a panel data set covering 21 of France’s 22 regions (we excluded Corsica be-
cause of its poor data) from 1985-91. Table 1 provides a brief description of the variables
and a list of the relevant regions. All figures are in 1992 Francs. Output Q is measured
as value added at factor cost and has been obtained from the Eurostat database ’New
Cronos’ (June 1999). Regional employment L is also taken from ’New Cronos’ and cov-
ers all private sectors of the economy. The private capital stock K is constructed by the
Laboratoire d’Observation Economique et des Institutions Locales (OEIL) using national data
from INSEE’s Compte de Patrimoine and allocating the national stock to the regions on
the basis of corporate tax rates.
The transportation infrastructure stock X is constructed as follows. As stock data was
not available at the regional level, we construct the stock from investment data using the
perpetual inventory method (PIM). In order to obtain a benchmark stock level for the
initial period, we allocate the national stock, for which data is given by the Fe´de´ration
Nationale des Travaux Publics (FNTP, see also Laguarrigue, 1994) across the 21 regions
in proportion to their average investment share over the first three years of the sample
period. The relatively slow rate of depreciation of infrastructure capital implies that
our stock converges slowly to the true one. In order to reduce possible biases in the
calculation of the infrastructure stock we use infrastructure investment data going back
to 1975. Aggregating our regional stock data to the national level and comparing it with
national data obtained from INSEE yields only marginal differences.
The transportation infrastructure investment data come from several sources. Rail-
way figures were provided directly by SNCF, the national railway company. Highway
figures, which are reported for the year in which the work is done (rather than for the
year of budget allocation—there is a delay between the two) have been collected by
the OEIL from data generated by the FNTP (see Fritsch and Prud’homme, 1994, for de-
tails). The FNTP’s data are based on reports by the Federation’s member companies.
Finally, investment data for waterways was taken directly from the FNTP’s statistical
yearbook. Although airport construction data, which we had collected from the Direc-
tion Ge´ne´rale de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC), would have been a natural inclusion in the
study, we found that they were not sufficiently reliable and consequently eliminated
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them from this study.
The number of industrial establishments with more than 500 employees (Nit) is taken
from various issues of L’Industrie dans les Re´gions, a yearly statistical publication of the
Ministry of Industry. From our model it is natural to suppose that the region Paris plays
a specific role in lobbying process for infrastructure investment, therefore we defined
two new variables as Nit(1 − DParis) and NitDParis, i.e. for the former the observations
from Paris are excluded whereas for latter all other observations except from Paris are
excluded. Finally, the partisan dummy variable (Dit) is equal to 1 when the majority in
a Regional Council (and hence the affiliation of the region’s President) and that of the
national parliament (and hence of the current government) are either both right-wing or
both left-wing, and zero otherwise.11 As our sample includes one regional election (in
1986) and two national legislative elections (in 1986 and 1988 respectively), Dit, which
was constructed using press sources, varies both across regions and across time. We
lagged it by one year to take account of budget delays.
TA BLE 1 HERE
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for these variables. In 1992 Francs, over the sam-
ple period, average infrastructure investment amounted to 1396 Francs per worker, or
roughly 0.54 percent of GDP; the infrastructure stock amounted to 50, 920 Francs per
worker, or 19.8 percent of GDP. The value of the highway infrastructure stock was about
5 times that of the railway stock and 70 times that of the waterways infrastructure stock.
TA BLE 2 HERE
3.2 Baseline estimates
Several further adjustments are needed before (6) and (17) can be taken to the data.
First, we drop the assumption that the weights on lobbying and non-lobbying terms
in the government’s objective function (1 − a and a respectively) add up to one. As
these weights are arbitrary, we will simply call them a1 and a2. Second, we approximate
the marginal product of infrastructure capital for the representative large firm in one
11“Right wing” was defined in the sample as RPR, UDF, Front National, and “Divers Droite”. “Left
wing” was defined as Parti Socialiste, Parti Communiste, Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche, various
environmentalist parties, and “Divers Gauche”. The “Divers Gauche” and “Divers Droite” categories
classify independent individuals according to their voting patterns.
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region by its aggregate value in that region; using the fact that, under technology (6),
F‘X  XQit=Xit = Xqit=xit and simplifying, (17) becomes
zit = a1X(qit=xit)q
−1=2
it + a2

X(qit=xit)Nit − l‘it

= PROD q
1=2
it =xit +LOBBY qitNit=xit +TAX l
‘
it, (18)
where PROD = Xa1, LOBBY = Xa2, and TAX = a2. Third, as (18) is nonlinear in xit,
using (8) to substitute for xit does not yield a closed form for zit. Therefore we take care
of the endogeneity of xit by instrumenting it with its lagged value. Fourth, we include
time dummies12 and regional dummies (for Ile-de-France in the production function,
and for Ile de France, Nord-Pas-de-Calais in 1991, and Centre between 1986 and 1990 in
the policy function; the first because it contains Paris and the last two because of large-
scale Eurotunnel and TGV construction). Fifth, in the policy function we include as a
separate regressor the “partisan” dummy Di,t−1. Finally, we assume an AR(1) structure
for the error term of both equations. Denoting fixed time-effects by t and t, t = 1 . . . T,
the system to be estimated is thus:
ln qit = t +K ln kit +X ln(xi,t−1 + zit) + ˜L ln(Lit) +PARIS DParis + 1it, (19)
zit = t +PRODq
1=2
it =xi,t−1 +LOBBY qitNit=xi,t−1(1 − DParis)
+LOBBY PARIS qitNit=xi,t−1DParis +TAXl‘it +PARTY Di,t−1
+ NORD DNord + PARIS DParis + CENTRE DCentre + 2it, (20)
where kit = kki,t−1 + "kit, k = 1, 2, and "kit are i.i.d normal variables with mean
zero and variance k. The estimation procedure is as follows. We estimate (19) and (20)
simultaneously by non-linear Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML),13 using a
Prais-Winston transformation which avoids omitting observations for t = 1, (Greene
1997, p. 601). For the non-linear OLS estimation we obtain the autocorrelation param-
eters k, k = 1, 2, by minimizing the Sums of Squares Errors (SSE) for each equation,
whereas for the non-linear FIML the autocorrelation parameters k are jointly estimated
with the other parameters. The results are reported in Table 3.
12Instead of fixed time effects we could also use linear time trends both for the policy equation and the
production function, as supposed in (6). While estimating the model with linear time trends does not
change the main results, using time dummies stresses also the cross-sectional variation between regions.
13Estimations have been carried out using PROC MODEL, SAS 6.12.
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Several specification tests are performed. In order to test the AR(1) specification
against the alternative of an AR(2) specification, we employ the Godfrey Lagrange mul-
tiplier tests for non-linear regression models (Godfrey 1988, p. 117; White 1992). The
test statistic has a critical value of 3.84 at a 5 percent level, which implies acceptance of
the AR(1) process for all our specifications (see Table 3). It is also comforting that nor-
mality of the error structure is accepted for both single equation tests (Shapiro-Wilk) as
well as for a system test (Henze-Zirkler) for all specifications.
Table 3 reports three different specifications of the policy function, labeled respec-
tively (b), (c) and (d), depending on which lobbying variable is used. In (b) both Nit
and Di,t−1 are included together; in (c), only Nit, the number of large establishments,
is included; in (d), only Di,t−1, the partisan dummy, is included. The estimated AR(1)
parameters 1 and 2 are about 0.90 and 0.72 respectively.
TA BLE 3 - 6 HERE
Two preliminary remarks on Table 3’s results are in point. First, the proportion of
the variability in regional infrastructure investments explained by the policy equation
is high (the R2 is about 0.86), given that the equation includes only Di,t−1 and three re-
gional dummies as out-of-model explanatory variables. Second, the reported parameter
estimates turn out to be fairly robust across estimation procedures (OLS and FIML) as
well as with respect to changes in the lobbying variable. This remarkably good fit of the
policy equation can also be seen by a comparison of the actual values of transportation
infrastructure investment from Table 4 with the predicted values from Table 5.
The results reported in Table 3 suggest that lobbying, as we proxy it, exerts a statisti-
cally significant and quantitatively non-negligible influence on the allocation of infras-
tructure investment across regions. Their primary interest is qualitative—namely, that
lobbying matters.14 Quantitative estimates are, of course, sensitive to model specifica-
tion (although the estimate of bLOBBY proved remarkably stable) but they nevertheless
provide a rough estimate of the orders of magnitude involved, and it is instructive to
take a look at them, albeit a very cautious one. Ceteris paribus, an additional “repre-
sentative” large establishment in a region brings that region 1.46 Francs of additional
14We do not directly interpret LOBBY, but the weight of lobbying by firms defined as a2 = LOBBY=X .
Statistical tests of the null hypothesis that a2 equals zero yield the following results: Likelihood Ratio
(LR) 5.86, Wald 2.90 and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 4.90. These tests are distributed as 2(1), thus at a 10
percent level the null hypothesis is rejected by all tests.
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infrastructure investment per worker each year; or, with an average of 1, 022, 000 work-
ers, a total of 1.5 million francs for the representative region, a relatively small amount
(the number of large establishments per region varies between 6 in Limousin and 113
in Rhoˆne-Alpes). A region with a president sharing the current national executive’s po-
litical obedience will attract 123.8 Francs more of infrastructure investment per worker
than one having a president of the ’wrong’ obedience; for the average region, this means
an additional 126.5 million Francs, or 8.8 percent of average infrastructure investment.
Moreover, lobbying by firms having large establishments in the region and the political
orientation of the region’s president slightly reinforce each other, as expected from our
two-stage lobbying model whereby firms first approach local politicians, who then take
up their demands to the relevant Ministry. Abundant anecdotal evidence15 suggests that
our results do capture a phenomenon widely perceived as important. Several caveats
are in point, however. First, in the model of section 2, lobbying comes from users of
transportation infrastructure, whereas in reality, the construction industry itself is one
of the most active lobbyists as far as new highway construction projects are concerned.
But the construction industry is composed of a few giants such as Bouygues for whom
location across regions is irrelevant, and a host of small firms many of which are below
our cutoff of 500 employees (a construction lobbyist recently boasted that the industry
association has “52,000 members, practically one in each commune”).16 This type of lob-
bying activity is not or only imperfectly picked up in our framework. Second, region
presidents are not the only local politicians involved; members of parliament are also
important relays of local lobbying pressure.
If the positive results concerning lobbying activity were to be expected—although
perhaps not as clear-cut as they turned out to be—the insignificance of the productivity
term, which picks up the government’s concern to allocate infrastructure investments
to where their marginal product is highest (and to foster regional convergence, since
the postulated functional form is concave), is more puzzling.17 Although it is certainly
15See for instance the cover story of the magazine Capital (June 18, 1998) entitled “100 lobbies qui font
la loi en France”; in particular pp 92–ff. According to the magazine, the construction industry is a ma-
jor political-campaign contributor and a powerful force behind highway construction projects, although
lobbying by French firms is expected to decline as a result of a Brussels directive imposing open bidding
procedures (and therefore diluting the return to lobbying).
16Capital, 18 June 1998, p. 92.
17As before, we do not directly interpret PROD, but the weight of productivity concerns by the govern-
ments defined as a1 = PROD=X . Statistical tests of the null hypothesis that a1 equals zero are not rejected
at a 10 percent level by the Likelihood Ratio, Wald and Lagrange Multiplier tests.
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possible that the government simply doesn’t care about the efficient allocation of re-
sources, this conclusion is probably a strong one to draw from such limited evidence
and given the scope for misspecification in a simple political-economy model. More-
over, the variety of state-aid schemes aimed at fostering stronger growth in backward
regions suggests that European governments, including the French one, do care about
convergence—unless, of course, these state-aid schemes are themselves driven by lob-
bying forces. An obvious alternative for the square-root form used in the first term of the
function U, namely a log form, gave very similar results. A convex form, being implau-
sible since implying preference for divergence, was also tried with inconclusive results.
It is therefore fair to say that, as far as this study is concerned, government objectives in
the allocation of transportation infrastructure investment are unclear once lobbying is
controlled for.
Production-function estimates are significant and have the expected sign. Constant
returns to scale are not rejected. The estimated elasticity bK of private capital is 0.181
and that of infrastructure bX is 0.101; both estimates are significant at the 5 percent level,
and remarkably stable across estimation procedures: the OLS infrastructure elasticity
estimate is about 0.099, suggesting, as noted in the introduction, that the simultaneous-
equation bias from OLS estimation of the production function is negligible. Our estimate
of the infrastructure share is much lower than Aschauer’s (1989) estimate on US aggre-
gate data (0.39) but the two are not directly comparable since Aschauer’s infrastructure
variable was a broad aggregate of public capital whereas ours is limited to transporta-
tion infrastructure. Munnell’s (1990) estimate, which was more directly comparable to
ours in that she used state-level data, was 0.14, whereas de la Fuente and Vives’ (1995)
estimate on Spanish regional data was somewhat higher than ours. Although plausible,
our estimate should nevertheless be interpreted cautiously, as bX, in all likelihood, picks
up not only the supply-side effects of infrastructure investments (what it is meant to
measure) but also their demand-side or Keynesian effects; it is in fact possible that the
latter dominates the former. Moreover, a common drawback of the production-function
approach is that it takes the private capital stock as fixed, which can be a valid approxi-
mation of reality only in the short run (see de la Fuente and Vives, 1995, for a discussion
and alternative formulation); the same is true of employment, although inter-regional
labor mobility is arguably a lesser problem than interregional capital mobility. Thus, our
estimates are best construed as short-term ones. Finally, we have not included human
capital for lack of reliable data; although this is, in general, a potentially serious omis-
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sion, systematic cross-regional variation in educational levels also may not be a serious
a problem given France’s relatively egalitarian education system.
As the rates of return on infrastructure capital implied by production-function esti-
mates have been a subject of intense debate in the US (see e.g. CBO, 1988, or Gramlich,
1990), it is instructive to calculate the rates of return implied by our estimates for private
and infrastructure capital. Let rK be the rate of return on private capital; in a competitive
environment the unconstrained demand for private capital is given by rK = bKQ=K.
Assuming that the short-run stock of private capital is at its long-run equilibrium level
and using national aggregates of Q and K averaged over our sample period, the implied
rate of return is 0.156, which is lower than estimates from US data (see e.g. Munnell,
1990b) but nevertheless plausible. As for infrastructure, the implied rate of return, using
again national aggregates averaged time-wise, is rX = bXQ=X = 0.522; this is slightly
higher than the upper bound of the range of values reported by the US Congressional
Budget Office, which vary between 0.35 for highway maintenance projects and 0.05 for
new rural highway projects (see Gramlich, 1994, table 4). Thus, the high rate of return
on infrastructure capital implied by our elasticity estimate suggests that in France’s case
there is some ground to the claim that, overall, transportation infrastructure is under-
provided; in fact, using our elasticity estimates, the value of the infrastructure stock that
would bring its rate of return down to the rate of return on private capital would be
115, 221 Francs per worker, or 2.3 times the current one. However, the difference in
rates of return between private and infrastructure capital should not be overplayed, as
rates of return are very sensitive to elasticity estimates, which are themselves fairly im-
precise.18 Moreover, France was, during our sample period, in the middle of a major ef-
fort of transportation infrastructure construction, both for highways and for high-speed
railway lines. The picture might be different a decade later.
Pork barrel (of which we found evidence) distorts not only the overall level of infras-
tructure investments, but also their spatial allocation. In order to assess the size of these
distortions, we perform two experiments. In the first, we calculate predicted optimal
values of infrastructure investments, zˆ0it, using the estimated coefficients of the policy
function’s “non-lobbying” terms. That is,
zˆ0it = ˆt + ˆPRODq
1=2
it =xi,t−1 + ˆNORD DNord + ˆPARIS DParis + ˆCENTRE DCentre. (21)
18In fact, the difference between rX and rK is statistically not significant at a 10 percent level.
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The resulting values of zˆ0it are reported in the second column of Table 6. The major draw-
back of this approach is that ˆPROD is a very imprecise estimate (indeed, not significantly
different from zero). Thus, in the second experiment, using the fact that the infrastruc-
ture stock is 0.43 times what it would take to bring its rate of return down to the rate of
return on private capital (15.6 percent), we simply assume that the aggregate (nation-
wide) level of predicted investment is also 0.43 times its optimal value when averaged
over the sample period; i.e.
å t å i zˆit = 0.43 å t å i zit, and solve the equation
2.3
å
t
å
i
zˆit = n
å
t
ˆt +
å
t
å
i
(q1=2it =xi,t−1) (22)
+
å
t
(ˆNORD DNord + ˆPARIS DParis + ˆCENTRE DCentre),
for the unknown parameter . The solution ˜ of (22) is then used in place of ˆPROD in
(21) to recalculate optimal regional investments. The resulting values are reported in the
third column of Table 6.
Whereas the coefficient of variation of actual investments (averaged over time) is
45 percent , the coefficient of variation of optimal investments is 45.2 percent according
to method 1 but only 33.8 percent according to method 2. Thus, our experiment suggests
that a least a part of the observed cross-regional variability in infrastructure investments
comes from pork-barrel terms. The reason for this is apparent: the optimal investment
rule calls for equalization of the term Xq
1=2
it =xit(after adjustment with regional dum-
mies); as long as output per head (qit) and the infrastructure stock per head (xit) do not
vary too much, the optimal allocation is nearly uniform. This result has an important
practical consequence: whenever political distortions to the allocation of infrastructure
are a source of concern—as they are in our sample—the uniform rule, which is simple
to administer and monitor, is a good rule of thumb. Of course, there is a caveat; namely
that if the ratio q1=2it =xit does not vary excessively in an industrial country with a large
existing infrastructure stock, the same is not necessarily true in developing countries
with patchy infrastructure stocks, where the uniform rule could be misleading.
4 Concluding Remarks
The primary interest of our results is that they highlight the importance of the pork-
barrel dimension of policy-making, suggesting that explicit modelling of the political-
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economy processes driving economic-policy decisions is interesting in its own right, ir-
respective of whether its omission would or would not introduce a simultaneity bias in
regressions where policy variables are treated as exogenous. Commenting on the high
rates of return on infrastructure investments estimated by Aschauer, Gramlich (1994) re-
marked, “If public investment really were as profitable as claimed, would not private in-
vestors be clamoring to have the public sector impose taxes or float bonds to build roads,
highways, and sewers to generate these high net benefits? [...] Very little such pressure
seems to have been observed, even when the implied econometric rates of return were
allegedly very high” (p. 1187). We find that, in the absence of a loud clamor, the quiet
whisper of lobbies can, indeed, be heard. The interest of our political-economy approach
is that it can provide indications—however rough—both on the departure of policy from
the social optimum and on the extent of special-interest influence. As far as policy im-
plications are concerned, our results contain good news and bad news. The bad news
is that influence activities appear to be significant drivers of infrastructure-investment
decisions, whereas non-lobbying governmental objectives, if any, are unclear. The good
news, however, is that the resulting distortions appear to be relatively minor. First,
feedback effects on production-function estimates are weak, and the marginal product
of infrastructure capital does not vary tremendously across regions, so that departures
from the first-best allocation of infrastructure across regions are fairly inconsequential.
Second, in rich industrial countries, transportation infrastructure investments are small
compared to the level of the existing stocks, so that political distortions in the amounts
and spatial allocation of investments are unlikely to make themselves felt on GDP before
a while. But one should not be excessively optimistic about this. First, if investment de-
cision have always been made on the basis of pork-barrel politics, the stock levels should
themselves be severely distorted. So our results beg the question: when did things start
getting seriously bad? In France’s case, the answer seems to be fairly recently. The con-
ventional wisdom among political scientists is that corruption has vastly expanded in
the 1980s, largely as a result of administrative reforms enacted in 1982 (see e.g. Me´ny,
1992; Borraz and Worms, 1996; or SCPC, 1994).19 Second, if pork barrel is prevalent in
infrastructure-investment decisions (although de la Fuente and Vives (1995) found little
trace of political influence in Spanish infrastructure investment decisions), developing
19We are grateful to Jean-Louis Briquet, from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, for a useful
conversation on this and for attracting our attention to the relevant political-science work.
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countries are likely to be less robust to the ensuing distortions simply because the stocks
are so much smaller relative to the investments. Under such conditions, political distor-
tions in the allocation mechanisms are unlikely to be innocuous.
If, as our positive analysis suggests, political distortions ought to be taken seriously,
at least in the long run, one should be able to offer normative guidance for the design of
rules or institutions that could mitigate those distortions. The second interesting aspect
of our results is that they provide just such a rule. Given our functional forms (alterna-
tive ones give similar rules) the first-best allocation of infrastructure equalizes the term
Xq
1=2
it =xit across regions. Provided that neither productivity levels (qit) nor infrastruc-
ture stocks per worker (xit) vary too much across regions (our data suggests that they
don’t), uniform allocation is a good enough rule of thumb. Even if the ratio varies, it
is not a very difficult one to compute, so the more sophisticated rule is itself not exces-
sively demanding. Of course, if the rule is clear, how it should be implemented is not as
clear, since rational politicians are unlikely to abide by a rule. What mixture of central-
ized vs. decentralized decision-making is least conducive to pork barrel is a question
that we leave open; only careful international comparisons will shed light on it. What is
clear from our work is that France does not yet seem to have the answer.
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Table 1: Variable Description and Regions
Variable Description
Q Regional GDP, million 1992 Francs
L Regional employment, million individuals
K Non-residential private capital stock, million 1992 Francs
X Transportation infrastructure stock, million 1992 Francs
Z Transportation infrastructure net investments, million 1992 Francs
N Number of establishments with more than 500 employees
Dit Dummy variable equal to 1 when regional council and national
parliament have same political majority.
Regions
Alsace Champagne-Ardennes Midi-Pyrene´es
Aquitaine Franche-Comte´ Nord-Pas de Calais
Auvergne Haute-Normandie Pays de Loire
Basse-Normandie Ile-de-France Picardie
Bourgogne Languedoc-Roussillon Poitou-Charentes
Bretagne Limousin Provence-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur
Centre Lorraine Rhoˆne-Alpes
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. C.V. Minimum Maximum
Q=L 256723 27380.40 0.106 195921 357617
K=L 298142 62624.98 0.210 188442 484980
X=L 50920 9412.91 0.185 35453 70935
Q=X 5.166 0.8416 0.163 3.849 7.405
Z=L 1396 628.15 0.450 412 4934
N  (1 − DParis) 35.27 21.66 0.614 5 113
N  DParis 7.19 32.42 4.505 0 170
Dit 0.435 0.50 1.143 0 1
XHIGHWAY=XRAIL 5.18 2.36 0.456 1.74 13.68
XHIGHWAY=XWATER 68.8 80.17 1.165 2.27 290
Total number of observations: 147
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Table 3: Estimation Results
(a) (b) (c) (d)
OLS FIML FIML FIML
Production Function Dependent Variable: ln qit
85 11.24 (23.50) 11.18 (20.91) 11.19 (20.94) 11.18 (20.89)
86 11.27 (23.52) 11.21 (20.93) 11.22 (20.96) 11.21 (20.92)
87 11.28 (23.53) 11.22 (20.94) 11.23 (20.96) 11.23 (20.92)
88 11.30 (23.54) 11.24 (20.95) 11.25 (20.98) 11.24 (20.94)
89 11.32 (23.58) 11.26 (20.99) 11.27 (21.01) 11.26 (20.97)
90 11.31 (23.55) 11.25 (20.95) 11.26 (20.98) 11.25 (20.94)
91 11.31 (23.52) 11.25 (20.93) 11.26 (20.95) 11.25 (20.91)
K 0.189 (5.44) 0.181 (4.77) 0.182 (4.80) 0.182 (4.82)eL 0.025 (1.60) 0.025 (1.43) 0.025 (1.44) 0.025 (1.44)
X 0.097 (2.30) 0.101 (2.14) 0.100 (2.12) 0.101 (2.15)
Paris 0.218 (5.20) 0.219 (4.27) 0.219 (4.57) 0.219 (4.58)
AR(1) 1 0.867 0.904 0.904 0.904
Godfrey LM 1.764 3.366 3.293 3.278
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.979 0.985 0.985 0.985
R2 0.9539 0.9537 0.9537 0.9537
Policy Function Dependent Variable: zit
85 848.7 (2.59) 879.8 (2.52) 997.2 (2.85) 1043.6 (2.57)
86 1159.8 (2.92) 1186.8 (3.40) 1304.4 (3.71) 1362.6 (3.36)
87 1199.4 (3.02) 1226.1 (3.58) 1340.8 (3.90) 1392.8 (3.50)
88 1539.4 (3.03) 1564.0 (4.56) 1730.1 (5.09) 1734.0 (4.37)
89 1433.3 (3.64) 1457.2 (4.28) 1622.6 (4.82) 1632.5 (4.15)
90 1949.9 (4.34) 1975.9 (6.03) 2039.6 (6.13) 2145.9 (5.61)
91 1767.7 (4.36) 1794.6 (5.67) 1853.3 (5.77) 1955.9 (5.28)
Prod -28165 (-0.79) -31545 (-1.08) -33253 (-1.12) -31319 (-0.89)
Lobby 1.334 (2.07) 1.456 (2.79) 1.388 (2.61) — (—)
Lobby Paris -1.775 (-0.89) -1.762 (-0.96) -1.914 (-1.03) — (—)
Party 120.5 (1.98) 123.8 (2.11) — (—) 117.9 (2.01)
Tax -1126.8 (-0.44) -1473.5 (-0.71) -1906.4 (-0.91) 376.1 (0.16)
Paris 1971.0 (0.99) 1993.9 (1.07) 2100.6 (1.11) -30.7 (-0.11)
Nord91 2373.3 (9.85) 2422.1 (10.23) 2457.3 (10.19) 2373.3 (9.98)
Centre86−90 708.5 (3.97) 779.1 (4.53) 771.4 (4.43) 636.9 (3.92)
AR(1) 2 0.783 0.718 0.720 0.785
Godfrey LM 1.250 0.661 0.647 0.985
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.982 0.980 0.974 0.983
R2 0.8593 0.8586 0.8546 0.8483
System
Henze-Zirkler T 1.198 0.817 1.112 0.899
Estimated asymptotic t-values are given in parentheses
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Table 4: Infrastructure Investment Allocation Across Regions and Years
Actual Values of Transportation Infrastructure Net Investment Per
Worker, 1985-1991, in 1992 Francs
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Alsace 1085 1454 1306 1708 1291 1685 1723
Aquitaine 688 1106 1090 1598 1533 1984 1496
Auvergne 613 1297 1543 2026 1949 2334 1358
Basse-Normandie 526 873 620 938 878 1402 1250
Bourgogne 529 944 1115 1665 1235 1697 1424
Bretagne 412 818 871 1432 1527 1904 1449
Centre 1357 2106 2613 3003 3492 3343 2373
Champagne-Ardenne 552 965 868 1281 1128 1892 2158
Charentes Franche-Comte 542 675 580 1052 836 1451 1074
Haute-Normandie 416 617 635 865 1127 1575 1662
Ile de France 455 834 1148 1621 1532 1730 1747
Languedoc-Roussilon 630 685 822 1391 1439 1735 1574
Limousin 981 1408 1515 1288 1407 1592 1432
Lorraine 1096 1086 860 1398 1232 1693 1681
Midi-Pyrene´es 811 1074 1127 1342 1402 1864 1608
Nord-pas de Calais 863 1766 1367 1983 1790 2936 4934
Pays de la Loire 868 1017 1111 1560 1255 1243 995
Picardie 1504 1625 1896 1732 1433 1586 1499
Poitou 888 1294 1095 1500 1186 1693 1276
Provence-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur 505 836 739 1189 1312 2077 2240
Rhoˆne-Alpes 1086 1338 1602 2218 1739 2142 2486
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Table 5: Predicted Values
Predicted Values of Transportation Infrastructure Allocation
from Table 3 (b), in 1992 Francs
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Alsace 772 1318 1410 1726 1549 1766 1566
Aquitaine 847 1042 1142 1451 1471 1886 1750
Auvergne 676 941 1254 1752 1743 2165 1987
Basse-Normandie 572 864 916 1182 981 1402 1317
Bourgogne 848 945 1030 1470 1537 1705 1551
Bretagne 595 791 867 1358 1343 1870 1676
Centre 808 2306 2073 2876 2757 3548 2188
Champagne-Ardenne 725 910 1026 1376 1246 1614 1684
Charentes Franche-Comte 471 839 756 1115 1033 1335 1320
Haute-Normandie 796 835 784 1223 953 1636 1461
Ile de France 504 810 930 1588 1521 1926 1754
Languedoc-Roussilon 770 971 828 1244 1292 1811 1552
Limousin 651 1201 1328 1592 1168 1979 1465
Lorraine 818 1333 1132 1426 1367 1706 1567
Midi-Pyrene´es 784 1105 1133 1483 1261 1787 1645
Nord-pas de Calais 1116 1225 1702 1582 1762 2350 4934
Pays de la Loire 821 1188 1055 1593 1485 1735 1232
Picardie 935 1639 1550 2055 1586 1813 1487
Poitou 807 1171 1278 1453 1396 1620 1536
Provence-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur 878 908 976 1210 1171 1740 1823
Rhoˆne-Alpes 1216 1474 1354 2039 2101 2165 1944
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Table 6: Simulated Solution Values
Actual, Predicted & Optimal Values of Transportation
Infrastructure Net Investment Allocation,
Averages of Years 1985-1991, in 1992 Francs
Actual Predicted Method I Method II
Alsace 1465 1444 1299 2077
Aquitaine 1356 1370 1275 2492
Auvergne 1589 1503 1464 2783
Basse-Normandie 927 1034 983 2586
Bourgogne 1230 1298 1205 2535
Bretagne 1202 1214 1150 2831
Centre 2613 2365 2266 3564
Champagne-Ardenne 1264 1226 1168 2542
Charentes Franche-Comte 887 982 982 2688
Haute-Normandie 985 1098 1020 2354
Ile de France 1295 1290 1968 3744
Languedoc-Roussilon 1183 1210 1169 2587
Limousin 1375 1341 1299 3005
Lorraine 1292 1336 1244 2575
Midi-Pyrene´es 1318 1314 1214 3269
Nord-pas de Calais 2234 2096 1933 3261
Pays de la Loire 1150 1301 1171 3088
Picardie 1611 1581 1480 2991
Poitou 1276 1323 1241 3045
Provence-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur 1271 1244 1179 2452
Rhoˆne-Alpes 1802 1756 1524 2949
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